Wednesday, October 15, 2003
growing insurgency
a few months ago, billmon linked to this policy brief by ahmed s. hashim, a professor of strategic studies at the u.s. naval war college. it's a long essay, but dr. hashim's basic point is that the united states military must act quickly and decisively in order to prevent the largely sunni insurgency in iraq from becoming a more generalized insurgency that draws in the country's majority shi'ite population. it's a very insightful study and well worth a full read if you have time.
of course, it's beginning to look like dr. hashim was shouting into the wind:
Shiite Factions Clash Near Shrine in Iraq
KARBALA, Iraq, Oct. 14 -- Rival Shiite Muslim groups exchanged gunfire overnight in this Shiite holy city, the first serious armed clash between Shiite factions since the Iraq war, and the top U.S. commander in Iraq warned Tuesday that American forces may soon have to move against one of the factions.
Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez said armed followers of Moqtada Sadr, a young Shiite cleric who has loudly opposed the presence of foreign troops in Iraq, have been regarded for months as an evolving threat to U.S.-led forces. Last week, in what American commanders described as an ambush, Sadr's Imam Mehdi army battled a U.S. patrol in Baghdad, killing two American soldiers.
now, this does not necessarily mean that the shi'i and the sunni are working together against the u.s. military, but it does represent the beginnings of what could potentially be quite a disturbing trend. as dr. hashim says:
Having been disempowered for much of their history, Shi'is have learned to calculate prudently the correlation of forces between them and the powers that be, to develop their own parallel social and political networks, and to be more patient in formulating a response to perceived oppression. To put it simplistically, Sunnis are more likely to rebel; Shi'is are more careful before they engage in rebellion.
thus, these violent outbursts from a shi'ite faction--whom, dr. hashim suggests, have usually taken a "wait and see" approach towards newly imposed authority--may indicate that they have finally waited and seen enough.
it is also possible, however, that moqtada sadr, the leader of one of the Shi'ite factions is merely trying to take advantage of the chaotic political situation to make a power grab:
Sadr, 30, is the son of the late Mohammed Sadiq Sadr, a cleric whose memory is revered across Iraq's Shiite heartland. But many Iraqis say the younger Sadr has neither the years nor the religious authority to assume the leading role he has presumed to take against the U.S.-led occupation. Last week, he announced that he would form a government to challenge Iraq's Governing Council, whose members were appointed by the U.S.-led occupation authority.
[snip]
But in Najaf and Karbala, authority over Iraq's Shiite majority remains in the hands of far more senior clerics, who have remained largely silent on the U.S. occupation while quietly lobbying to ensure Shiites' rights and advantages as Iraq prepares to create a new constitution. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani evidently retains the largest following, along with a handful of other senior clerics.
so perhaps the most disturbing trend is not necessarily the fact that shi'i are now attacking american troops, rather it is the fact that the disgracefully inept post-war planning by the bush administration has created a situation in which local religious leaders have more power than the occupying power. again, dr. hashim:
The American inability to restore law and order and basic services has redounded to the advantage of the Shi'i clerics from the Hawza, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and Al-Sadriyyun, who have established effective, informal networks of local governance and resource allocation in cities where they have established their respective presence. These clerical networks provide the distribution of food and medical supplies, guard important buildings such as clinics and hospitals, dispense justice, and collect looted goods that have been returned.
there is a silver lining in the cloud, however, as it seems that sadr's popularity is declining precipitously.
The officer said he believes Sadr is actually becoming desperate as his calls for demonstrations draw smaller and smaller crowds. The Thursday attack on U.S. forces, the officer said, "was a plea for propaganda. . . . He's trying to draw attention to himself."
thus, sadr's actions are more likely a last-ditch attempt to draw the american occupational forces into armed confrontation in order to paint them as aggressors, thereby strengthening his waning credibility. if so, the situation may not be quite as dangerous as it seems.
but either way, the u.s. military is going to have to act very carefully so as to avoid creating more people like this guy:
"America is the leader of the strife," said another [Iraqi protestor], visibly angry. "There is no stability. There is no security. They are energizing the terrorist people."
update: the inimitable billmon has beaten me to the punch.
a few months ago, billmon linked to this policy brief by ahmed s. hashim, a professor of strategic studies at the u.s. naval war college. it's a long essay, but dr. hashim's basic point is that the united states military must act quickly and decisively in order to prevent the largely sunni insurgency in iraq from becoming a more generalized insurgency that draws in the country's majority shi'ite population. it's a very insightful study and well worth a full read if you have time.
of course, it's beginning to look like dr. hashim was shouting into the wind:
Shiite Factions Clash Near Shrine in Iraq
KARBALA, Iraq, Oct. 14 -- Rival Shiite Muslim groups exchanged gunfire overnight in this Shiite holy city, the first serious armed clash between Shiite factions since the Iraq war, and the top U.S. commander in Iraq warned Tuesday that American forces may soon have to move against one of the factions.
Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez said armed followers of Moqtada Sadr, a young Shiite cleric who has loudly opposed the presence of foreign troops in Iraq, have been regarded for months as an evolving threat to U.S.-led forces. Last week, in what American commanders described as an ambush, Sadr's Imam Mehdi army battled a U.S. patrol in Baghdad, killing two American soldiers.
now, this does not necessarily mean that the shi'i and the sunni are working together against the u.s. military, but it does represent the beginnings of what could potentially be quite a disturbing trend. as dr. hashim says:
Having been disempowered for much of their history, Shi'is have learned to calculate prudently the correlation of forces between them and the powers that be, to develop their own parallel social and political networks, and to be more patient in formulating a response to perceived oppression. To put it simplistically, Sunnis are more likely to rebel; Shi'is are more careful before they engage in rebellion.
thus, these violent outbursts from a shi'ite faction--whom, dr. hashim suggests, have usually taken a "wait and see" approach towards newly imposed authority--may indicate that they have finally waited and seen enough.
it is also possible, however, that moqtada sadr, the leader of one of the Shi'ite factions is merely trying to take advantage of the chaotic political situation to make a power grab:
Sadr, 30, is the son of the late Mohammed Sadiq Sadr, a cleric whose memory is revered across Iraq's Shiite heartland. But many Iraqis say the younger Sadr has neither the years nor the religious authority to assume the leading role he has presumed to take against the U.S.-led occupation. Last week, he announced that he would form a government to challenge Iraq's Governing Council, whose members were appointed by the U.S.-led occupation authority.
[snip]
But in Najaf and Karbala, authority over Iraq's Shiite majority remains in the hands of far more senior clerics, who have remained largely silent on the U.S. occupation while quietly lobbying to ensure Shiites' rights and advantages as Iraq prepares to create a new constitution. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani evidently retains the largest following, along with a handful of other senior clerics.
so perhaps the most disturbing trend is not necessarily the fact that shi'i are now attacking american troops, rather it is the fact that the disgracefully inept post-war planning by the bush administration has created a situation in which local religious leaders have more power than the occupying power. again, dr. hashim:
The American inability to restore law and order and basic services has redounded to the advantage of the Shi'i clerics from the Hawza, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and Al-Sadriyyun, who have established effective, informal networks of local governance and resource allocation in cities where they have established their respective presence. These clerical networks provide the distribution of food and medical supplies, guard important buildings such as clinics and hospitals, dispense justice, and collect looted goods that have been returned.
there is a silver lining in the cloud, however, as it seems that sadr's popularity is declining precipitously.
The officer said he believes Sadr is actually becoming desperate as his calls for demonstrations draw smaller and smaller crowds. The Thursday attack on U.S. forces, the officer said, "was a plea for propaganda. . . . He's trying to draw attention to himself."
thus, sadr's actions are more likely a last-ditch attempt to draw the american occupational forces into armed confrontation in order to paint them as aggressors, thereby strengthening his waning credibility. if so, the situation may not be quite as dangerous as it seems.
but either way, the u.s. military is going to have to act very carefully so as to avoid creating more people like this guy:
"America is the leader of the strife," said another [Iraqi protestor], visibly angry. "There is no stability. There is no security. They are energizing the terrorist people."
update: the inimitable billmon has beaten me to the punch.
iraq: check; syria: check; iran: check; palestine: check
looks like we've now succeeded in getting just about everyone in the middle east pissed off with us:
At Least 3 Dead as Blast Hits U.S. Convoy in Gaza
it's unclear from the story whether this attack was deliberately aimed at americans or not, but if it was, this is a truly scary development.
looks like we've now succeeded in getting just about everyone in the middle east pissed off with us:
At Least 3 Dead as Blast Hits U.S. Convoy in Gaza
it's unclear from the story whether this attack was deliberately aimed at americans or not, but if it was, this is a truly scary development.
it is imminently clear that the threat is imminently close to becoming imminent
the more i think about this whole "imminent" debate, the more i realize how specious the administration apologists' arguments are. let's face it: they dug their own grave on this one during the pre-war buildup by muddying the waters with a half-dozen shifting rationales for the war. if people are now unjustly accusing the administration of characterizing the threat as "imminent," it's only a result of the administration's inability to clarify its rationale for the war beforehand.
furthermore, as i said in my last post, this whole question of "imminency" (is that even a word) is a red herring. what exactly constitutes an imminent threat? what's the difference between a "grave and growing" danger and an imminent threat? who knows and who cares--under the doctrine of pre-emption, either one constitutes justification for war.
so my advice to conservatives is to stop trying to clear up the waters that you yourself were so successful at muddying before the war. whether the war was supported under the rhetoric of "imminency" or "imminent imminency" or whatever, the admin still sold the american people a bill of goods.
the more i think about this whole "imminent" debate, the more i realize how specious the administration apologists' arguments are. let's face it: they dug their own grave on this one during the pre-war buildup by muddying the waters with a half-dozen shifting rationales for the war. if people are now unjustly accusing the administration of characterizing the threat as "imminent," it's only a result of the administration's inability to clarify its rationale for the war beforehand.
furthermore, as i said in my last post, this whole question of "imminency" (is that even a word) is a red herring. what exactly constitutes an imminent threat? what's the difference between a "grave and growing" danger and an imminent threat? who knows and who cares--under the doctrine of pre-emption, either one constitutes justification for war.
so my advice to conservatives is to stop trying to clear up the waters that you yourself were so successful at muddying before the war. whether the war was supported under the rhetoric of "imminency" or "imminent imminency" or whatever, the admin still sold the american people a bill of goods.
Monday, October 13, 2003
fearmongering
it's funny to see the moralizers on the right carefully parsing bush's pre-war words in a clintonian effort to prove that the administration never explicitly hyped the threat from saddam hussein as "imminent." dandy andy, for example, uses this quote from bush's state of the union speech to prove his point:
"Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option."
now, it would behoove us to look closely at this statement to see exactly what bush was trying to say. at first glance, it appears that sullivan is correct: bush is being careful to say the threat is not imminent. but a closer analysis suggests a rather different interpretation: that bush is seeking to establish that the old definition of what constituted an imminent threat is no longer applicable in a post-9/11 world. that, in point of fact, the danger posed by terrorism is so acute and so ubiquitous, that every threat should be treated as imminent.
he does this mainly by exploiting his audiences' uncertainties and apprehensions about terrorism. the rhetorical question that follows the opening sentence, for example, is a clear appeal to the american people's post-9/11 fears:
"Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike?
his point in asking this question is to assert that terrorists, because they work clandestinely and underhandedly, never pose an "imminent threat" in the traditional sense that, say, the ussr did during the cold war. rather, in a post-9/11 world, the threat of terrorism is very real, extraordinarily dangerous and--most importantly--omnipresent. in essence, he suggests that the threat, whether visible or not, is always imminent.
he then builds on this point with his next sentence:
"If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late.
here, he suggests that we can never know for certain when a threat is or is not "imminent," and thus we must assume that all of them are. that is, once we perceive a threat is "imminent" in the traditional sense, it is already too late.
he then brings the argument back to his central focus--i.e. saddam hussein--saying:
"Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option."
once again, he exploits the fears of his audience. saddam hussein is an untrustworthy tyrant of questionable sanity and wholly without restraint. given the opportunity, he would attack the united states with the deadliest weapons in his arsenal, and therefore, we cannot afford to let him remain in a position to do so.
taken as a whole, the entire statement was not meant, as sullivan and other administration apologists would have you believe, to undermine the immediacy of the threat of saddam hussein. it's not like bush was saying, "sure, the guy's not an imminent threat but we have to take him out anyway." rather, what bush is arguing is that while hussein did not pose an "imminent" threat in the traditional sense, in a post-9/11 world we must assume a threat exists, whether it is explicitly stated or not.
indeed, this is the very same argument that sullivan himself made in the run-up to the war (and is still making in a modified and far more stubtle form after it). he went out of his way to suggest that the burden of proof was on the terrorists, that, in a post-9/11 world, the threat posed by terrorism was a given, was an indelible fact of life, and thus required strong and decisive action on the part of our government. in essence, he was arguing that these semantic debates--just how much danger did saddam actually pose? would a secular baathist and a religious extremist ever really unite against the united states? could the threat saddam hussein represented really be considered "imminent?"--were superfluous because we had to assume the threat was real.
the point is, whether or not the administration ever stated explicitly that the threat posed by saddam hussein was "imminent," by preying on americans' post-9/11 fears they created the perception that it was. and of course, they had to create such a perception, because, as sullivan himself well knows, if they hadn't, the american people would have never supported the war.
it's funny to see the moralizers on the right carefully parsing bush's pre-war words in a clintonian effort to prove that the administration never explicitly hyped the threat from saddam hussein as "imminent." dandy andy, for example, uses this quote from bush's state of the union speech to prove his point:
"Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option."
now, it would behoove us to look closely at this statement to see exactly what bush was trying to say. at first glance, it appears that sullivan is correct: bush is being careful to say the threat is not imminent. but a closer analysis suggests a rather different interpretation: that bush is seeking to establish that the old definition of what constituted an imminent threat is no longer applicable in a post-9/11 world. that, in point of fact, the danger posed by terrorism is so acute and so ubiquitous, that every threat should be treated as imminent.
he does this mainly by exploiting his audiences' uncertainties and apprehensions about terrorism. the rhetorical question that follows the opening sentence, for example, is a clear appeal to the american people's post-9/11 fears:
"Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike?
his point in asking this question is to assert that terrorists, because they work clandestinely and underhandedly, never pose an "imminent threat" in the traditional sense that, say, the ussr did during the cold war. rather, in a post-9/11 world, the threat of terrorism is very real, extraordinarily dangerous and--most importantly--omnipresent. in essence, he suggests that the threat, whether visible or not, is always imminent.
he then builds on this point with his next sentence:
"If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late.
here, he suggests that we can never know for certain when a threat is or is not "imminent," and thus we must assume that all of them are. that is, once we perceive a threat is "imminent" in the traditional sense, it is already too late.
he then brings the argument back to his central focus--i.e. saddam hussein--saying:
"Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option."
once again, he exploits the fears of his audience. saddam hussein is an untrustworthy tyrant of questionable sanity and wholly without restraint. given the opportunity, he would attack the united states with the deadliest weapons in his arsenal, and therefore, we cannot afford to let him remain in a position to do so.
taken as a whole, the entire statement was not meant, as sullivan and other administration apologists would have you believe, to undermine the immediacy of the threat of saddam hussein. it's not like bush was saying, "sure, the guy's not an imminent threat but we have to take him out anyway." rather, what bush is arguing is that while hussein did not pose an "imminent" threat in the traditional sense, in a post-9/11 world we must assume a threat exists, whether it is explicitly stated or not.
indeed, this is the very same argument that sullivan himself made in the run-up to the war (and is still making in a modified and far more stubtle form after it). he went out of his way to suggest that the burden of proof was on the terrorists, that, in a post-9/11 world, the threat posed by terrorism was a given, was an indelible fact of life, and thus required strong and decisive action on the part of our government. in essence, he was arguing that these semantic debates--just how much danger did saddam actually pose? would a secular baathist and a religious extremist ever really unite against the united states? could the threat saddam hussein represented really be considered "imminent?"--were superfluous because we had to assume the threat was real.
the point is, whether or not the administration ever stated explicitly that the threat posed by saddam hussein was "imminent," by preying on americans' post-9/11 fears they created the perception that it was. and of course, they had to create such a perception, because, as sullivan himself well knows, if they hadn't, the american people would have never supported the war.
